

米国－イスラエルおよび米国－日本同盟関係の起源、 耐久力および安定性の研究

国際社会環境学専攻

ハダド・ミハル

A Study of the Origins, Durability and Stability of the US-Israel and US-Japan Alliances

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Abstract

この研究は、超大国の同盟の選択について説明し、どのような種類の同盟が持続し、安定しているか、を識別することを目標とする。この目標のために使用された方法は、グローバルなシステムおよび国家レベルを合わせたオリジナルな理論モデルである。ほとんどの理論的な研究は、超大国の同盟での振る舞いに注目していない。しかし、これはこの研究の焦点になる。この研究で示された仮説は、民主主義の超大国は地域大国との同盟を選ぶこと、そして安定して永続的な同盟は民主主義の地域大国とのものだろうということである。地域大国の地位は同盟結成の決定的な要因であり、民主主義の要因は、同盟の耐久性および安定性を説明する。

Key Words

同盟, 民主主義, 米国

Introduction

The US-Israeli and US-Japan alliances have both lasted long and endured many conflicts and changes in the international system and throughout remained overall stable. These two sets of alliances have been the focus of many separate studies, especially since the end of the Cold War. In the Asia Pacific region, much has been written about the new triangle; China, Japan and the US. One of the most debated topics in the past decade has been: How will the US balance its alliance with Japan with its relations with China? The US-Japan alliance has had constant economic conflicts which left doubt about its continuity and overall stability. In the Middle East (ME) region, many changes have occurred in the last decade, and the US' involvement in the region has grown tremen-

dously especially after the attacks on 9/11. The political dynamics in the region are different from the Asia Pacific, but many of the concerns are similar. Similarly, in the Middle East, the US' choice of allies has been debated. Will the US maintain its alliances with Israel despite strong disagreements? Does this alliance still meet the US' domestic, global and regional goals and strategies? The future of these alliances, their effectiveness and stability were often questioned in the 1990's. The US-Israeli alliance and the US-Japan alliance seem at times to complicate rather than aid other US policies in their respective region. Often it seems that these alliances clash with other regional policies and interests. These two cases are chosen because they are both referred to as 'special', their future having been doubted despite their importance in their regions and because both have

overcome many conflicts and continued to expand their cooperation. I wish to explore the reasons for their origins, durability and stability, and highlight the similarities, for the first time. For that aim, I have developed a theoretical model which I would like to present in this article.

The purpose of this paper is to provide an explanation for America's strategies, policies and its rationale in choosing Israel and Japan as allies at the level of global analysis. The research also extends to providing an explanation as to why these alliances are stable and will remain important for the US in the future, despite regional and even global changes that may occur. The study aims at analyzing these alliances from the American perspective of choosing these countries as allies and then maintaining these alliances for a long period of time. I wish to explain why these countries were important to the US as allies, and why the relations not only continued for a long period of time, but were reasonably stable. The leading research question in the study is: What are the decisive factors in the formation, durability and stability of the US-Israel and the US-Japan alliances?

The theory suggested here is a combination of the analysis of the international system structure explaining the formation, and the state level analysis of regime type which will help explain durability and stability of these alliances. The hypothesis proposed here is that a democratic superpower will choose alliances with regional powers and that the stable and durable alliance will be with democratic regional powers. The importance of the democratic factor stems from shared interests and values, and facilitates overcoming disagreements through similar political processes which emphasize dialogue and cooperation rather than coercion. In this article space allows me to give only a summary of the main important events which help in analyzing the case studies.

Theoretical Framework

Hypothesis I-A superpower will align with at least one regional power in each region. A superpower needs to align with at least one, if not all regional powers in any given region, if it wishes to continue its worldwide status. This study focuses on the superpower as the initiator of the alliance. The common assertion is that states create alliance in order to enhance their security or as a response to a threat. The idea of a shared external threat gives a simple explanation to alliance formation; but as others have done, I suggest that there are other strategic interests taken into account when selecting allies. Balance of power theory states that nations choose an alliance either to balance against the strongest power in the system, or to bandwagon¹ with it. This provides the basic rationale for the hypothesis; a great power wishes to align with middle ranking powers in order to balance against its adversary, thus preserving its status.

In any system, a superpower will want to form an alliance with actors from different regions. This is for reasons of holding its position and interests in each region, and hence globally. A superpower has interests and strategies globally, and in order to maintain its global position it has to maintain certain orders in the sub-systems as well. I suggest that a superpower's desire or even need to form alliances with regional powers is acute. Generally, a superpower aims at preserving the status quo and will thus form different alliances with both status quo and revisionist states. This web of alliances will be formed with both key actors and lesser nations in the core and other regions. As most regions are multipolar subsystems, a superpower will choose at least one, if not more, regional powers as allies. A superpower can not go it alone; it must have powerful allies to maintain its position globally. An alliance with another, non-threatening power will facilitate its reach and pre-

serve its status within sub-systems as well as globally.

An alliance with a regional power with potential for an international key role can help influence or restrain that regional power from certain actions and provide more access to information about its interests, policies and strategies.² An alliance is also a way of securing a regional actors' loyalty in regional and global affairs, especially at a time of globalization. Gaining some autonomy of a regional power is more useful than autonomy of less powerful nations. Securing a close ally in each region will provide the superpower with greater accessibility to the region and means of maintaining its interests in the region. Maintaining order in the region will be easier as well; as the superpower can ask the regional power for assistance, or ask it to refrain from intervening. Regional power can provide the basis and facilitate the achievement and success of the great power's engagement in the region. Alignments with key actors in those regions are the best way to maximize its benefits and realize all its interests.

It is important to note that ideology is not the important force in explaining alliance formation, yet it does play a considerable role. As Russett stated, the rewards to an actor is greater when the coalition is ideologically comfortable than when it is not.³ Walt also notes that states are more likely to follow their ideological preferences when they are already fairly secure.⁴ This applies to the study of superpowers, as their alignment selection is not based on their immediate security needs. The focus of this analysis is on structural incentives for the formation of the alliances, but ideological compatibility and other domestic reasons create a wider window of incentives for the creation of the alliance. Therefore, the democratic character of the superpower is significant.

In sum, common threat, balances of power, threat or interest theories and system structure provide the basic explanation for alliance behavior. This hypothe-

sis wishes to enhance and specify these by adding a factor of regional powers. As will be shown, alignment with regional powers can incorporate a reply to threats of the system structure and facilitate maintaining of interests and preserve the global and regional balance of power. An ideologically suitable alliance will be even easier to form, and thus will be even more frequent. Consequently, a superpower will choose to align with at least one regional power in each region.

Hypothesis II-An alliance between a democratic superpower and a democratic regional power will endure system structural changes and prove to be more stable. In other words, the democratic feature will be the dominant factor in signaling the stability and durability of an alliance between a superpower and a regional power. Here too, it will be the superpower's reasons for maintaining the alliance that will be examined. The independent variables in this case are democracy and the asymmetric relations between the allies; the dependent variables are the stability and durability of a given alliance.

System change is the vital element in the model proposed here. As G. Snyder notes, de-alignment in a bipolar system is irrational, as the superpowers are solidly committed by their own interests to defend their allies.⁵ Snyder contends that since the security dilemma in bipolar systems is less severe, and since the risks of abandonment are low, alliances can not collapse or change basically until the structure changes.⁶ Thus, according to the realist school, system structure alone can provide ample explanation for the durability (and formation) of the US-Israel and US-Japan alliance. The puzzle is then, what made these alliances and other (such as NATO) Cold War-based alliances survive the structural changes that occurred in 1990? There have been attempts to clarify the persistence of Cold War alliances after the elimination of a major common threat. Walt attributes the endurance of the alliances to the fact that

these alliances were both a stabilizing force during an era of rapid change and a useful mechanism for shaping the post-Cold War order.⁷ The emphasis on the regional power factor might also explain sustaining system transformation. The need for strong allies in different regions is even more acute for a super-power in a unipolar system. Another explanation is the US' emphasis on ensuring its credibility as an ally, and therefore continues its commitments to these countries. In this study, I would like to propose that the two sets of alliances in the case studies examined will not persist merely as an example or a managerial tool in this era of changes. Democratic cooperation and shared values signal an even more durable alignment.

Morrow argues that asymmetric alliances are more durable than symmetric alliances mainly for two reasons. First, changes in capabilities are unlikely to alter the security benefits of the alliance for the lesser power, since most of its security gain comes from the larger state. Such changes will also not change the autonomy benefits for the larger power, since these benefits do not depend on capabilities. Second, asymmetric alliances move the involved states toward a more even mixture of security and autonomy than one could obtain alone. In sum, with a larger utility gain, these alliances should last longer.⁸ Thus, asymmetric alliances are both easier to form and to maintain.⁹ Asymmetry between such powers is apparent, but this asymmetry is not great, as all the countries in these case studies are identified as powers. In these cases, and as Bennett found, the asymmetry variable alone can not be sufficient in explaining the durability and stability of the alliances. Surveying reasons for alliance durability, Walt finds that alliances are more likely to persist when there is asymmetry of power, when the allies share similar political values and when the relationship is highly institutionalized.¹⁰

Gaubatz adds that liberal democracies are more

likely to maintain their alliance commitments over time than are non-liberal states. He argues that shared norms, namely cooperation and amity, between democracies are coupled with generally greater stability in the behavior of democracies over time relative to that of other states. Democratic governments are unable to shift policy rapidly in the face of stable public preferences, and the primacy of the rule of law and respect for legal commitments in liberal societies lead to smooth, regularized leadership transitions and institutional stability which lead to stable international commitments. Moreover, many democracies have common interests, which lead democratic states to prefer to ally with other democracies.¹¹ Bennett reaffirms that alliances involving liberal states do appear to last longer than alliances involving less liberal states.¹² Thus, former studies have shown democracy contributes to alliance durability.

Different characteristics of democracy are brought as a basis to the claim that democracies make more stable and enduring allies. Choi argues that democracies with open, transparent political system, can more effectively promote any kind of cooperation.¹³ Choi quotes Keohane stating that states which seek cooperation with other states need not only information about the other government's resources and formal negotiating positions, but also knowledge of their internal evaluations of the situation, their intentions, the intensity of their preferences, and their willingness to adhere to an agreement even in adverse future circumstances. Choi adds that democracies have greater capacity than non-democracies for communications and accessibility, a fact that enables an alliance to be more stable and to last longer.¹⁴

Durable alliances increase other areas of interactions between the allies. Sandler states that contemporary allies are often drawn closer by sharing economic linkages, democratic principles and membership in other international organizations.¹⁵ Weitsman argues that alliances are formed not only for security

arrangements but also to manage conflict among member states.¹⁶ In periods of peacetime, she concludes, alliances function to manage conflict among member states.¹⁷ These can explain both the duration of an alliance and the relative stability of it.

Different studies have shown that an alliance between two democracies has proven to be durable and stable due to the inherent structure of their policies and shared interests. Democracies are better able to cooperate with one another and shared democratic institutions facilitate achieving compromises when conflicts between the members of the alliance arise. The democratic feature also makes it difficult for a state to abandon the alignment. Moreover, interdependence gradually evolves; economic ties and constituency support expand areas of cooperation and communication and ensures continuity and consistency. Furthermore, in times of conflict, an alliance between democracies can be used as a conflict management tool.

Thus, any alliance between two asymmetric democracies will prove to be durable. The factor of a superpower and a regional power alliance is important also for realizing global interests of the great power. Strategic settings, policies and interests are vital factors for a superpower in choosing its allies. These can be realized better through alliances with regional powers. Put together, an alliance between a democratic superpower and a regional democratic power will prove to be durable and stable. It has been suggested by IR scholars that a theory of alliance behavior must combine factors within the state, notably domestic political support and resource availability, with considerations framed by the international system within which alliances are formed.¹⁸ In this model of analyzing superpower alliance behavior, I aim to do just that—combine different factors and levels of analysis into one detailed analytical tool.

The two hypotheses combined provide an explanation for the formation, the stability and the durability of a given alliance between a superpower and a re-

gional power. The first hypothesis can only explain the formation of an alliance; the second its durability and stability alone. Only taken together can alliance behavior of a superpower be fully understood and explained. Their combination is important for a broad analysis of the present case studies and other alliances. The combination of two levels of analysis, system and state, is thus better for explaining more aspects of the alliance, such as strategic interests, economic cooperation or conflict and domestic pressures such as the Jewish Lobby within the US.

US-Israel : The Formation of the Alliance

In 1948 the state of Israel was formed and the United States was quick to recognize the new state and develop diplomatic relations with it. Studies have shown that the role of the Jewish vote was the main reason for the US' support for the formation of Israel.¹⁹ This is the basis for the idea that America's "special" relationship with Israel is mostly based on the power of the Jewish vote, Jewish money and political influence in US domestic politics. However, Safran and others effectively show that at no time during the pre-1967 period was the Jewish influence and general American sympathy sufficient to induce the American government to form with Israel a bilateral or multilateral formal alliance.²⁰ At this time, the US supported the idea of a Jewish state and provided economic aid, but did not provide any military aid or even international rhetoric support. The special relations evolved gradually and were apparent only 20 years after Israel's formation, in 1967, when the US publicly supported Israel and became its prominent arms supplier.

In the early years of Israel's existence, the US was preoccupied with engaging the Arab states into a regional alliance, in the context of the Cold War. Relations with Israel were a liability and were therefore played down. The US disapproved of Israeli policies

and actions in the region and publicly exerted pressure to coerce Israel to alter its actions. At this time the US and Israel shared interests such as containing the Soviet power in the region, common ideology of democracy in foreign policy and the right for self defense, but these were insufficient for broad cooperation and formal relations.

The first major crisis in the region was in 1956. At the time, the US was aggravated by the joint British, French and Israeli operation against Egypt. This put the regional balance of power at risk and the US coerced Israel to withdraw. Despite the grave disagreements on the objective and means in this crisis, in its aftermath the US policy slowly shifted with the realization that Israel's deterrent power might be useful for promoting American interests in the region. The Suez Crisis, other internal crisis in Middle Eastern countries and intra-Arab rivalries were thought to change the balance of power in the region and led to a gradual shift in American policy toward the region, and Israel specifically. In his study, Ben Zvi effectively shows that the second Eisenhower administration marks a subtle but profound shift in American policy toward Israel. Most analysts and historians see a first change with Kennedy's decision to sell Hawk anti-aircraft missiles to Israel in 1962, and the "special relationship" as well established publicly following Israel's swift victory in the 67' Six Day War. But the policy shift actually began under the Eisenhower administration, as it gradually recognized changes in the region especially after the July 1958 crises in Lebanon, Iraq and Jordan. During that time, the pro-Western government of Iraq was overthrown. The monarchy in Jordan seemed endangered, and the political situation in Lebanon appeared to be so unstable that the Eisenhower administration dispatched U.S. Marines to Beirut. In light of this instability, Israel showed itself to be the sole stable pro-Western power in the region.²¹

Before the 1967 War American interests in the ME

were at stake, as Safran describes ; "A military victory for Nasser would have put him in a position to establish his hegemony in the Middle East and sweep it clean of any remaining American positions, including the oil rich Arab countries. Even just a political victory would have placed Nasser in a strong position to venture a new confrontation with Israel later on, and in the meantime would have put him in a dangerously powerful position in the entire Arab world, to the detriment of the United States and the benefit of the Soviet Union."²² It was Israel's apparent power and regional status which seemed to benefit US' interests, as Safran continues ; "Israel's complete and swift victory within six days, achieved through her own unaided forces, in many ways turned the tables on the Soviets and their clients. It was the US who was now in a position to use its client's victory in order to check and roll back the Soviet position in the ME, to promote a new order in the area that protected and advanced its own interests, and to use its Middle East position as a leverage to influence the Soviets' behavior in the global arena."²³

The Six Day War established and institutionalized the US-Israeli alignment. By the end of the war, Israel's regional military superiority was apparent and utilizing this status coincided with America's overall regional and global interests. Moreover, from the US point of view, there was a clear danger from the Soviet Union ; and yet the Middle East was secondary in importance to other areas of conflict, at this point, Vietnam. Thus, Israel appeared as a pillar of stability in the defense of American ideological interests.²⁴ The close US-Israeli ties were acknowledged and strengthened after Israel's influence in the region was demonstrated. The US became Israel's main arms supplier and moreover, Israel was part of American strategic regional arrangements and policies.

In sum, the US-Israeli relations evolved into an alliance gradually. I argue that the US chose Israel as an ally for many reasons, but the decisive one was

the benefits for the US from Israel's power and strength in the region. Prior to Israel's show of strength in 1956 and the crises in Iraq, Jordan and Lebanon, American Jewry, common Soviet threats, common interests and shared democratic values were insufficient by themselves to stimulate a more favorable American policy. It was only after the Eisenhower administration began to recognize the strategic dimension and to appreciate how shaky other pro-Western governments in the region actually were, that the US started to adopt a more explicitly cooperative policy toward Israel. While the shift toward a closer United States-Israeli strategic relationship had its origins as far back as 1958, the United States initially took only modest and tentative steps. The relationship expanded slowly and then deepened after the Six Day War of 1967 into a virtual alliance.²⁵

Changes in the balance of power in the region and actors, such as Egypt's strength were important in America's changed ME policy. The US had failed to bring Arab countries collectively into some form of association with the Western defense system. Instead of this policy, the US sought to preserve its position in the area and check the spread of Soviet influence through a policy of stabilization and regional balances of power. Thus a change in the global strategic situation brought a change in orientation toward Israel.²⁶ And because Israel was politically stable and militarily powerful, it could be a particularly valuable asset in the context of the American design to achieve a favorable stability and balance of power in the area. The fact that the US already had moral interests in Israel backed by a powerful domestic lobby only made the decision to elaborate the alliance easier, but as those did not change from 1948 it is the show of Israel's strength that was the decisive factor.

US-Japan ; the Formation of the Alliance

At the end of World War II, Japan's potential cou-

pled with international and regional circumstances led the US to secure Japan as a Western ally. I argue that the US chose Japan as an ally for various reasons, and Japan's potential role in the region was an important incentive for the alliance. Indeed, common threats, interests, the international and regional settings were all important in the US' choice to form an alliance with Japan, yet the key factor for the US was Japan's potential regional role and power.

The US' decision to use atomic bombs on Japan derived mainly from a desire to end the war, to ensure its dominance in the Occupation and a desire to shape the post-war Asian region politically and economically to suit American interests. The US had to control the Occupation in order to contain Japan's potential power so it would not again be threatening force and would thus be likely to utilize Japan's location and industrial capabilities for America's benefits. America's chief objectives in the Occupation were demilitarization and democratization. Thus the first two years of the Occupation show a desire in the US for constructing a democratic and non-threatening nation in Asia. The strategic importance of Japan was a significant consideration from the onset of the occupation. Japan's geo-strategic location provides a vital, if not crucial, basis for the whole East Asian and Southeast Asian regions. Apart from the strategic location, Japan's economic potential was also imperative. In the wake of World War II, Japan lay in ruins, along with Europe and other Asian nations. China, the only other former and potentially great power in the region, was again in a civil war along with economic underdevelopment and devastation after a prolonged war with Japan. This does not mean that the US did not form other alliances in the region, but none of those were considered to assume a leading regional role in the economic sphere or in the Cold War rivalry. Despite its shattered economy, Japan seemed like the only nation that might recover better and faster than other nations in the area, and

be able to assume a leading role in the region, but at the same time had to be restrained and monitored.

The realization in the US in 1947 that the Cold War was intensifying is of great significance for understanding the course the Occupation of Japan took. As Kawai notes ; “[T]he drift of China toward Communism became unmistakable and the US began to conceive of Japan, rather than China, as the new major force in the Far East for peace, democracy and friendliness toward the US.”²⁷ The international setting provided for the recognition that Japan could better serve as a strong ally.²⁸ At this point, a strong ally meant an economically prosperous and politically liberal democratic and mostly stable state. Moreover, the US needed Japan to serve as a role model and influence other countries in the region. Since the US had full access to Japan through the occupation it was easier that the US would focus on Japan.

International developments and poor economic conditions in Japan hastened the US to change the course of the occupation. Thus began the “Reverse Course.” Both the Japanese and German economies needed to recover and their industries revived, as they were considered the key to the balance of power in their respective regions.²⁹ Economic recovery seemed the only way to secure these countries’ regional role. Both lay in ruins, but both were once great powers and had potential to take on that role again and were thus important to nurture within the American ideology of containment policy. Consequently the US allocated resources to accelerate Japan’s economic recovery. The “reverse course” concentrated on vast economic aid and industrial incentives. The chief engineer of the reverse course was George Kennan, who envisioned Japan as the centerpiece of an Asian regional economy.³⁰ In the battle against Communism in the Asian region, Japan’s role was essential and could only be maximized through economic recovery and growth rather than slow re-

forms and weak economy. Thus, the international setting, security and economic considerations coincided into one clear policy-build Japan into a powerful regional ally which would aid American regional and global strategies.

The Korean War established and reaffirmed US’ policies toward Japan and East Asia. In 1949, the State Department sought to establish a “great crescent” of nations in Asia, reaching from Japan to India.³¹ As stipulated in NSC 48 issued in 1949, the US included Japan in its grand design of containment directed against the Soviets and strove to block Communism. The Korean War’s influence was still important in that it confirmed US fears of a coordinated global strategy of Communist expansion.³² Thus, American policies in Asia and towards Japan, were confirmed and strengthened. Giffard writes that “[I]n terms of supply, logistics and communications, Japan was a key factor in determining the strategy of the United States....and the facilities available in Japan were indispensable to its success.”³³ Japan’s strategic role in American military endeavors to contain Communism in Asia was increasingly viewed as essential. The Korean War accelerated the negotiations over the peace treaty and security treaty signed between the US and Japan. American analysts saw political and economic value in Japan, rather than just a military position. Creating an alliance would signal to other regional nations of a new non-threatening Japan, a move that would help stabilize the area. The form of a security treaty also helped create a Japanese dependency on the US, and thus reassure the region and secured Japan’s cooperation with the US in other issues.

Japan’s position as a regional power resulted mainly from American endeavors to assist it to achieve this status. It was the US which directed post-war Japan into not only its domestic national character but also its regional role. Cumings argues that it was between 1947 and 1950 that the US defined Ja-

pan's role in world affairs, a position which Japan held throughout the Cold War.³⁴ This role was a leading one which, in the first years, was mainly based on potential capabilities. The only nation capable assuming this leading role in the region was Japan, which was coupled with the US' need for a strong ally in the region in light of international events taking shape into a bipolar system. This enforces the premise of this study; a Superpower's need to secure regional powers as allies is essential.

At the end of World War II, the new world order was beginning to unfold and the US realized it would have to reconstruct the Asian region. It was clear that the US would not be able to maintain alone the order in every single region. The US needed a strong, stable and reliable ally which would preferably share its ideology and that would accept its regional designs and help maintain American policies in the Asian region. As LaFeber states, "[T]he US policy objective was consistent; keeping Asia open to American interests while integrating the region within an open, global, capitalist framework. Japan was less an end in itself than the means, in Washington's eyes, for achieving the larger regional and global purposes of US foreign policy."³⁵ International, regional, military and economic interests coincided into one objective; rebuilding and strengthening Japan and securing it as a democracy and an ally. The importance of Japan's role, rather than any other nation, was unquestionable once the Cold War was set in motion. By providing for Japan's security and by intertwining its foreign and military policies in a US-controlled alliance, the US tried to reassure other Asian nations that Japan's new role would help rather than threaten them. In this way, the US secured a potential regional power as an ally and helped stabilize the regional balance of power. Japan's past and future potential were the key factors in signaling America's choice in it as an ally. Other geo-strategic and economic interests, threats and strate-

gies were vital in the evolution of the alignment, but the focus on Japan was a direct result of its power in the past and potential in the future.

US-Israel : The Durability and Stability of the Alliance

The US-Israel relations went through major transformations from 1970, and despite numerous crises, cooperation persisted at all times. In the 1970's, the alliance with a strong democratic Israel proved beneficial, as the US could use its leverage over Israel to promote its interests in settling the Arab-Israeli conflict. In the 1980's, cases of severe tensions were overshadowed by expanding and intensifying cooperation in all areas. Common democratic values and practices were a key factor in overcoming crises and stabilizing the alliance. In the 1990's, peace in the Middle East seemed at first achievable, but by 2004 these hopes were shattered. While supporting Israel at times, the US was highly critical of its military actions toward the Palestinians. Israel's regional status gradually decreased and Israel suffered worldwide criticism for exercising excessive force. Yet, the US still maintained close relations with her. Since the 80's the relations were more formal and institutionalized, ensuring cooperation even at times of severe tensions. The exchange of information, military doctrine alongside gaining leverage over Israel assures the US that the alliance with Israel remains valuable. This section aims to show that instances of crisis and cooperation created a complex mixture of military, political, historical, ideological, moral, and economic trade-off within the alliance. It is contended that the shared democracy is the underlying reason for the stability and durability of the alliance.

On October 6, 1973, Egypt and Syria attacked Israel in a combined effort. At first it seemed Israel could fight back, but within a few days, Israel's defeat was considered a possibility. Losing Israel was

considered a setback to both US domestic and strategic interests, as it was a reliable pro-Western country in a vial region.³⁶ The US began a massive airlift in response to a Soviet airlift for the Arab side.³⁷ The 1973 war made the US the most “vulnerable foreign power to the war and its global fallout, but it also made the US uniquely qualified to tidy up when the shooting stopped.”³⁸ The US had to assure that Israel would not completely humiliate Sadat and Egypt, in order for post-war negotiations to succeed.³⁹ Consequently, the US moved forcefully to secure an immediate cease-fire and the agreement with the Soviets over the cease-fire conditions was reflected in UN resolution 338.⁴⁰ The cease-fire brokered with the Soviets was not received favorably by Israel, but Israel had to comply with it.⁴¹

At the end of the war, The US goals materialized ; as Egypt sought⁴² closer ties with the US and was thus willing to make concessions. However, Israel emerged stronger and harder to convince. Israel’s new rightwing Prime Minister, Begin, proved adamant in his views, and Israel’s strong military position enabled him to retain his position.⁴³ In this case, too, the US used Israel’s dependency to reach an agreement. In an elaborate study, Ben Zvi shows that the US found that in most cases where pressuring was necessary Israel responded well to the carrot (aid) rather than the stick (suspension or delay of promised aid).⁴⁴ A peace agreement was eventually reached and signed, and the US provided both countries with large annual aid packages. The Egyptian-Israeli peace accord, together with other global developments, changed the regional balance of power. Israel retained its military supremacy, Egypt lost some of its status as the leader of the Arab world, and the Soviets were excluded from the peace process and thus, ME politics. Israel’s vital interests in retaining its power together with its growing economic and military dependency on the US produced the desired (by the Americans) concessions. Israel’s democratic

character assured these concessions would be implemented. Without the alliance and promised aid and support to Israel, Israel might have proved to be even harder to convince. Since the US and Israel had somewhat contradicting goals, the informal alliance served as an instrument for mutual trust and a guarantee of future support.

In 1982 Israel invaded Lebanon and it was quickly evident that the Israeli swift operation was not confined to Southern Lebanon and Israel went further into Lebanon, reached Beirut, and attacked Syrian forces. The massacre at Sabra and Shatilla aroused strong international resentment. The US was in a quandary ; attempting support for a constantly challenging ally while not alienating regional and international allies and in the process also achieving its national aims. As a result of the initial support and lack of condemnation of Israel, the US’ credibility as a reliable intermediary and guarantor in the ME was tarnished.⁴⁵ The US’ ambitions and goals in the war were completely shattered and the bombing of the American Embassy in Beirut prompted the US troops to leave.⁴⁶ Following this bombing, the American pressure on Israel to evacuate the area escalated, and in May 1983 an Israeli-Lebanese agreement was reached, although not fully implemented.⁴⁷

This crisis presented gradually an extremely low point in the relations, but the core foundation of the relations remained intact. However, this strain on the relations did not last long. For, the US still saw that strategically and politically, Israel was an ally that was best kept close. Several milestones expanded the US-Israeli security ties-the 1983 American-Israeli agreement on the establishment of a formal Joint Political-Military Group ; the 1986 decision to include Israel in Reagan’s SDI research and development program and in 1987 a new Memorandum Of Understanding and subsequently the Congress formally recognized Israel as a “major non-NATO ally.”⁴⁸ In the economic sphere, the relation prospered

as well. In 1985, the United States and Israel signed a Free Trade Area Agreement.⁴⁹ This was an important agreement for Israel, much dependant on the American market. Technological research and development collaboration were already formalized in 1977 in the framework Binational Industrial Research and Development, which was expanded further in the 80's.⁵⁰

The US not only shares (in the past, the present and the future) general broad values and norms with Israel as a democracy, but the US also realizes that shared regime type can assist the US in advancing its goals. Undoubtedly the US has strategic goals in the region which Israel, as a regional power, can assist in, but closer ties can also bring the US more leverage over Israel. Israel, as a democracy, is more transparent in its preferences and the ability to maintain better, open communication would provide the US with better evaluations of Israel's position with regard to where it is more insistent and where concessions can be made. In this way, the US can exert its influence through a calculated selection between coercive and encouraging measures in order to persuade Israel.⁵¹

The 1991 Gulf War shows that Israel could also be a possible obstacle for the US in achieving and protecting its interests. In this case, the threats were not identical-Israel was worried first about its security and the US considered the threat to the oil supply and world order as imperative. Nevertheless, the US and Israel cooperated in the war with the long term objectives of preserving the balance of power in the region, and promoting peace and democracy in the area. The 1990's began with ground breaking achievements with Peace in the Middle East. Israel and many of its neighboring nations were discussing and reaching peace accords, with intense and active American support and pressure. However, by the middle of the decade, the relations hit more strains with a new rightwing leadership in Israel and postponement of implementing agreements. The US was

caught between the two sides and while trying not to let the situation deteriorate to war, chose at the end not to pressure either side. Despite conflicts over long term interests concerning peace, strategic ties continued to develop with programs and frameworks for assistance and cooperation maintained. As Berman describes ; “[I]n 1996, more than 90 American military exercises, consisting of maneuvers and training drills conducted in conjunction with IDF forces and materiel, were held in Israel, including extensive training and coordination by the US Air Force, Navy and Army.”⁵² Another strategic cooperation MOU was signed in 1998, which the US viewed as a confidence building measure.⁵³ Despite disagreements over the pace of the peace process during the last years of the 90's, there was no visible decline in the level of strategic cooperation.⁵⁴

In the first four years of the new millennium, US-Israeli relations plunged from a high point of cooperation to an all time low since 1967. From a point of understanding and sharing an objective over war on terrorism at first, the relations deteriorated to grave disagreements over Israeli military actions. These endangered American regional objectives and thus the US exerted more pressure and shows overall discontent with Israel's policies. At the same time, the US continued to provide international support for Israel, as well as military and financial aid. Cooperation frameworks continue to thrive, in strategic military, political and economic fields. The relations can, and do continue to endure these extreme low periods, as they are highly institutionalized and both societies still share common democratic principles and a similar political vision.

Alongside periods when US' and Israeli objectives and policies coincided, many times the existence of the alliance put the US in awkward predicaments. As Walt states, Israel, “[T]he country that is probably most dependent on American support, is also one of the more independent in its behavior.”⁵⁵ Walt elabo-

rates and writes ; "Israel's enormous dependence on the US did not stop it from bombing Iraq, annexing the Golan Heights, invading Lebanon and laying siege to Beirut, expanding settlements on the West Bank....despite the fact that each step was contrary to expressed US preference."⁵⁶ Thus the maintenance and stability of the relations make an interesting case for analysis.

The American domestic support for Israel, embedded in the Israeli lobby, can not fully explain the persistence of the alliance. From the 1980's, the American Jewish community was transformed from a cohesive entity united in its unqualified support for Israel into a fractured and fragmented community, and thus its power decreased.⁵⁷ As public opinion in the US generally is favorable toward Israel, especially in comparison to Arab states, this can account for the durability of the alliance. This support is not only based on historical factors and affinity, but mostly on common democratic values. The democratic factor is also important in maintaining the stability of the alliance. Shared democratic regimes provide for extensive political contacts and institutional building of the alliance. Since the 1980's there has been a spillover from basic strategic cooperation to many different interactions and communications, greatly contributing to the institutionalizing of the relations. As Steinberg states ; "[T]he institutionalization in the relationship resulted in the ability to ride out short term policy disagreements."⁵⁸ Shared democratic institutions facilitate achieving compromises when conflicts arise, through open dialogue and discussion under different frameworks. Thus, the strategic dimension of the foundation of the alliance expanded through more extensive political interactions into institutionalizing of the relations, which in turn provided for the greater stability these relations demonstrate.

US-Japan : the Durability and Stability of the Alliance

Over time, the US-Japan alliance has broadened and the US and Japan have expanded cooperation on various issues ranging from security, the economy, technology, education to culture. The alliance has overcome many crises and conflicts, and was repeatedly reaffirmed and redefined, as lessons from conflicts were implemented. Throughout the crises, the alliance was beneficial to the US in maintaining an important democratic regional power as an ally. A cycle of friction leading to greater cooperation frameworks dominates the relations throughout the post war period.⁵⁹ Continuing negotiations, collaboration, creating new forums for discussion and joint projects are not simply a result of strategic and economic interest in the alliance-better cooperation is mainly a result of common core democratic values in both countries. The alliance serves as a basis for broad political and economic cooperation and the argument asserts that shared democracy is an essential factor in the durability and stability of the alliance.

The Vietnam War added \$1 billion to Japan's GDP because of the increase in US military presence and activities. Washington was aggravated that Japan reaped economic gains, but was unwilling to assume any of the war's burdens.⁶⁰ According to Schaller, the Vietnam War had a dramatic impact on the US-Japan relations and that overall the relations were undermined. Massive anti-American and anti-War protests in Japan compelled the Johnson administration to make several concessions on issues such as trade, China and Okinawa.⁶¹ In the 1969 Sato-Nixon Communiqué, the return of Okinawa to Japanese sovereignty was agreed upon.⁶² Nixon agreed to return Okinawa by 1972, and even pledged to remove nuclear weapons from the islands, subject to the consent to reintroduce them in an emergency, which was indirectly allowed under the revised 1960 security

treaty.⁶³ On the governmental level cooperation was expanded during and after the war and brought about the return of Okinawa. The protests in both countries over the war led to even greater cooperation in order to mend the relations. Understanding the power of the protests in a democratic regime, the US allowed for more concessions, agreeing to return Okinawa, which was an issue highly debated in Japan. Thus, contrary to Schaller's argument, the relations were not seriously undermined and cooperation persisted.

The lowest point in the relations were in the early 1970's, with US unilateral actions in the global economic system and in opening diplomatic relations with China. In Japan, the moves toward relations with China raised problems of trust and led to questioning the security costs and benefits of the alliance. These severe crises, however, contributed to reaffirming the alignment and the mechanisms to broaden and assure cooperation, embedded in the 1978 Defense Guidelines. Although the relations were considerably less stable in this period, terminating the alliance was not considered. The US' interests in an alliance with a regional power continued, especially in light of the economic interdependence and the alliance's position as a balancer in the region. Japan's dependency on the US made the endurance of the alliance apparent despite grave differences and breaches of trust. As the foundations of the relations lay in strategic interests which slowly evolved to economic interdependence, the democratic factor was not yet the main stabilizing force, but it did contribute. Shared views, values and regime characteristics can facilitate overcoming crises and maintain greater understanding of the other's position and the lessons of the crises led to the 1978 Guidelines, in an attempt to resume greater collaboration and dialogue. Crises and disputes led to expanding bilateral cooperation formally and trying to overcome and avoid destabilizing incidents in the future.

After the turbulent 70's, the 1980's were less tur-

bulent but disputes persisted. As cooperation expanded and economic trade increased, more areas of disagreement surfaced. More pressure was put on the US to resolve economic issues, as military collaboration and burden sharing was emphasized. Japan tried to resist both, agreeing to mild concessions. Yet, bilateral relations were stable in this period, as none of the disputes were elevated to a crisis level. Apart from strategic interests, increased economic interdependence added another interest in maintaining close ties. Grimes notes that, "[B]ilateral trade and payments imbalances have been at the core of some of the most contentious episodes of the US-Japan relationship, including trade frictions, exchange rate pressures and attempts at macroeconomic policy coordination."⁶⁴ However, cooperation never ceased and agreements were reached on several different issues.

By the beginning of the 1990's the US-Japan alliance was thought to be highly unstable, and its continuity doubted.⁶⁵ This was not only due to continuing conflicts, but mostly due to American need and pressure for Japan to assume a greater military role in the region. Japan continuously resisted this pressure, yielding very gradually. Moreover, economic interests and profound interdependence required a framework for coordination between the two biggest economies in the world. The alliance served as a mechanism to coordinate and collaborate on different issues in the economic conflict, as well as security arrangements. In the early 90's the alliance was neither obsolete nor unstable. Incentives were found in all areas for the endurance of the alliance, and these incentives served also as reasons for riding out disputes. Shared regime, values, principles and compatible political process add not only interest in maintaining the alliance, but serve as a stabilizing force as these are broader and more stable preferences than ad hoc economic and security interests.

In the first half of the 90's, disputes and lack of coordination led both countries to expand dialogue

and cooperation forums and reaffirm their alliance. A series of incidents in the region caused worry in both Japan and the US ; the North Korean nuclear crisis and the 1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis. Cases of friction like the Gulf War and the North Korean crisis in 1994 led to the 1996 communiqué and the 1997 New Defense Guidelines and stability was maintained. Both countries realized the importance of the alliance, and the shared objectives specifically in each case and in the broader sense of promoting democratic principles. But the democratic factor was not merely another common area for Japan and the US. Similar political processes and values also assist in ameliorating conflict and promoting the resolution of it.

From the late 90's through 2004, areas of cooperation increased. The US and Japan strengthened their security ties with the 97 Guidelines and the Nye initiative, and although this was less effective in the initial response to the North Korean missile launch, in the war on terrorism after 9/11, cooperation expanded and reached new heights. Economic friction was not resolved, nor will it in the near future, but all disagreements are handled by dialogue and discussion and compromises are attained. Democracy and common political principles, as well as common goals of promoting these values, facilitate enduring challenges the international and domestic settings present.

Conclusion

The two hypotheses combined provide a broad explanation for the formation, durability and stability of these alliances. The hypotheses assist in analyzing and studying the two case studies here, the US-Japan and US-Israel alliances. The hypotheses taken together provide an analytical tool to better explain more aspects of alliance behavior of a superpower. Harris and Cooper note that "[T]o sustain a bilateral alliance, benefits must exceed costs for both parties,

but it is difficult to define and measure alliance costs and benefits precisely. They include not just immediate security benefits of financial costs, but often more substantial social and political costs and benefits."⁶⁶ The combination of two levels of analyses, system and state, is better for explaining varied aspects of the alliance, especially in given periods when the alliance did not seem to benefit American interests or policies. The examples presented in this study focused on the times when advantages to the US seemed to be questioned, and the theoretical framework was used as the tool to emphasize the reasons why the alliances endured and cooperation deepened. The incidents I chose to elaborate upon are not random cases, but fit together to illustrate the following: The formation of the alliances is a result of many reasons, but the decisive one is the expected benefits of an alliance with a regional power; the durability of the alliance is also complicated and due to many reasons in which common democratic interests and values prevail, and that the stability in these alliances is a direct result of various democratic characteristics which reduce conflicts. Most experts in US-Israel and US-Japan relations agree that the democratic factor is a stabilizing force in the relations and various scholars' analyses are shown to prove and emphasize the importance of the democratic factor. My conclusions challenge the view that these alliances' future is doubted with more of the severe disputes. Conflicts are important as lessons for the future, but most of them do not signal a serious long term rift in the relations. Since cooperation and collaboration are maintained in so many fields, serious rifts with a spillover of conflict from one sphere to others have rarely happened. Therefore, the alliances are predicted to continue.

The inherent limitation of this study is embedded in the choice of the case studies. These cases do not show differences in the dependent variables; the stability and durability of the alliances. Both alliances

endured and demonstrated remarkable stability. Moreover, in both cases the smaller state is a regional power, and so other case studies of alliances with a smaller non-regional power should be tested. This limits the generalization and greater implications of the theoretical model proposed here. For greater validity and predictability, these hypotheses must be tested on a greater number of different case studies, which I aim to do in the future.

Although prediction to other cases is difficult with this limited study, prediction can be made with regard to the two case studies. This analysis can thus help speculate on the future of these relations and predict that these alliances will continue to thrive and overcome conflicts until a major change occurs in the US' international status. The study's importance is in providing a new theoretical tool for analyzing aspects of these alliances. This study is also useful for further studies in highlighting the importance of a regional power's status in a superpower's alliance choices. Importantly, it emphasizes for the first time the similarities in the US-Israel and US-Japan alliances, which provided evidence for identifying patterns in American alliance behavior.

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